Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00692 01 OF 05 081050Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
----------014893 081325Z /41
O R 080902Z MAR 78
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0474
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 JERUSALEM 0692
NODIS
FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 76

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, XF, US
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN MARCH 7

1. SUMMARY: MY LAST MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE HEADING HOME FEATURED ANOTHER LONG DISCUSSION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WITHDRAWAL TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I HAD THE FEELING WE WERE GOING THROUGH A DRESS REHEARSAL FOR BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGON. BEGIN, SUPPORTED BY HIS ADVISORS, WERE AT THEIR LEGALISTIC BEST. THEY ADVANCED A NUMBER OF INGENIOUS -- IF NOT PARTICULARLY CONVINCING -- ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR THESIS THAT ISRAEL COULD BOTH ACCEPT RESOLUTION 242 AND AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAIN THAT IT DID NOT REQUIRE APPLICATION OF WITHDRAWAL TO THE WEST BANK/GAZA. THE MAIN ARGUMENT PUT FORWARD WAS THAT EACH SIDE IS ENTITLED TO ITS OWN INTERPRETA-TIONS OF 242: THE ARABS CLAIM IT REQUIRES TOTAL WITHDRAWAL; THE ISRAELIS CLAIM IT DOESN'T HAVE TO APPLY TO ALL FRONTS.
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00692 01 OF 05 081050Z

THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE ITS OWN INTERPRETATIONTOO, BUT IT WAS UNFAIR, ADDED YADIN, FOR THE U.S. TO ADMONISH ONLY ISRAEL WHEN IT EQUALLY DISAGREED WITH THE ARAB INTER-PRETATION. DAYAN SUPPLEMENTED THIS WITH ANOTHER THESIS: IT REALLY WASN'T A LEGAL QUESTION AT ALL AND NEVER HAS BEEN. UNDER THE FORMER ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, THERE WAS THE ALLON PLAN AND NOW WE HAD THE BEGIN PLAN. THEY WERE

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

QUITE DIFFERENT BUT EITHER WAS CONSISTENT WITH 242 IF THE
ARABS WERE TO ACCEPT IT.

2. THIS WAS A WELL-ORCHESTRATED PERFORMANCE WITH NO
DISCORDANT THEMES VOICED BY ANY OF BEGIN'S ENTOURAGE.
THERE WAS NO VISIBLE SIGN OF GIVE IN BEGIN'S FUNDAMENTAL
POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. HE SAID BLUNTLY AT ONE POINT IN
THE CONVERSATION THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT AGREE TO A
DEMAND THAT IT ACCEPT THE APPLICABILITY OF WITHDRAWAL
TO ALL FRONTS. HE SAID HE SEES HIS WASHINGTON VISIT AS THE
OPPORTUNITY TO RECAPTURE THE SUPPORT FROM THE U.S. FOR ISRAEL'S
PEACE PROPOSALS HE BELIEVES HE HAD IN DECEMBER BUT LOST AS A RESULT
OF SADAT'S VISIT. HE IS COMING ARMED TO THE TEETH WITH
LEGAL AND HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS.
WE CAN BEST MEET HIM BY
COMING BACK REPEATELY TO THE SIMPLE THEME THAT IF
BEGIN PERSISTS IN HIS POSITION ON THIS ISSUE IT WILL
BRING THE PEACE PROCESS TO A HALT, AND SINCE THE U.S.
CANNOT SUPPORT ISRAEL IN SUCH A COURSE, IT WOULD POSE
A MOST SERIOUS ISSUE IN U.S. - ISRAELI RELATIONS. END
SUMMARY.

3. I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF IN
HIS KNESSET OFFICES EVENING OF MARCH 7. PRESENT ON THE ISRAELI
SIDE WERE YADIN, DAYAN, BARAK, AVNER, AND ROSENNE. ACCOMPANYING
ME WERE AMBASSADOR LEWIS, STERNER, KORN, AND SHERMAN.
SECRET

SECRET

4. I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER I DID NOT HAVE MUCH TO REPORT ON
THIS OCCASION AS NOTHING OF GREAT CONSEQUENCE HAD HAPPENED OF
A CONCRETE NATURE ON MY RECENT STOPS IN AMMAN AND CAIRO. I THEN
PROCEEDED TO GIVE HIM A SOMEWHAT ABBREVIATED VERSION OF THE
BRIEFING OF MY TALKS IN AMMAN AND CAIRO THAT I HAD GIVEN THE
FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE MORNING (SEPTEL). BEGIN INTERVENED
ONLY ONCE DURING MY PRESENTATION -- TO ASK WHETHER, WHEN
KING HUSSEIN SPECIFIED
TOTAL WITHDRAWAL, HE WAS INCLUDING JERUSALEM. I SAID THAT
ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT SPECIFIED THIS EXPLICITLY ON THIS OCCASION,
IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD INCLUDE EAST JERUSALEM
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF HIS DEFINITION OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL.
BEGIN ALSO ASKED AT THE END OF MY PRESENTATION WHETHER IN
MY JUDGMENT THERE WAS STILL THE POSSIBILITY THAT AFTER HIS
VISIT TO WASHINGTON THE EGYPTIANS WOULD PRODUCE A COUNTER-
PROPOSAL ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. I SAID IT WAS
MY DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WOULD, BUT POSSIBLY ONLY
AFTER I RETURNED TO THE AREA.

NOTE BY OC/T: NODIS CAPTION ADDED BY MR. SUMMERS, S/S-O.

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00692 02 OF 05 081112Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
----------015277 081329Z /41
O R 080902Z MAR 78
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0475
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 JERUSALEM 0692
NODIS
FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 76

5. BEGIN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT MY MISSION HAD ACHIEVED DEFINITE RESULTS. EGYPT AND ISRAEL WERE BACK IN COMMUNICATION AGAIN. HE, IN FACT, HOPED THAT THIS RENEWED COMMUNICATION WOULD LEAD TO A PERSONAL MEETING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND SADAT. THERE WAS MUCH THAT A HEART-TO-HEART PERSONAL TALK COULD ACCOMPLISH. HE AND SADAT NEEDED TO TALK THINGS OVER. BEGIN SAID THAT IF LETTERS WERE TO REMAIN THE ONLY FORM OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THEM, SADAT WOULD CONTINUE TO TERM ALL HIS EXPLANATIONS "THE SAME OLD ARGUMENT." (I HAD DESCRIBED TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN MY BRIEFING THAT THIS WAS SADAT'S ONLY COMMENT AFTER READING HIS LETTER.) SOMETIMES, SAID THE PRIME MINISTER, OLD ARGUMENTS ARE MORE VALID THAN NEW ONES. PERHAPS AFTER HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON, THERE WOULD BE AN OPENING FOR A PERSONAL MEEETING BETWEEN HIM AND SADAT.

6. BEGIN SAID THAT HE WAS GIVING THOUGHT TO CONVEYING A MESSAGE TO SADAT AFTER HIS WASHINGTON VISIT TO LET THE TWO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00692 02 OF 05 081112Z

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

COMMITTEES RESUME THEIR WORK. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IT
WAS POSSIBLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IN OTHER FORMS,
BUT IT WAS MUCH BETTER TO SIT AROUND THE TABLE AND HAVE
DIRECT COMMUNICATION.

7. BEGIN SAID THAT IN SUMMATION, THE RESULTS OF THE
ATHERTON MISSION WERE NOT SENSATIONAL BUT NEVERTHELESS
IMPORTANT. A LINK HAD BEEN RESTORED WHICH GAVE HOPE FOR
THE FUTURE. "WE ARE GRATEFUL TO YOU." BEGIN SAID HE WAS
LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. MAYBE THERE
WOULD BE SENSATIONAL RESULTS IN THIS CASE. ANYWAY, THE
MEETING WOULD BE BETWEEN FRIENDS.

8. I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER I APPRECIATED HIS COMMENT,
ESPECIALLY SINCE THE PRESS SEEMED CURRENTLY TO BE PUTTING
THE INTERPRETATION ON MY MISSION THAT IT HAD REACHED AN
IMPASSE. I THOUGHT THE MISSION HAD BEEN USEFUL IN ESTABLISH-
ING THE PATTERN OF CONTINUING NEGOTATIONS EVEN IN
CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT
PROGRESS.

9. DAYAN SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE TWO POINTS, BOTH OF THEM
RATHER THEORETICAL AT THIS STAGE. SUPPOSE THE LINK THAT
ISRAEL HAD BEEN ASKING FOR BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND
MILITARY COMMITTEES WERE DROPPED AND ISRAEL WERE TO AGREE
SIMPLY TO CONTINUE THE MILITARY COMMITTEE MEETINGS ON THE
CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS TO GET DOWN TO BUSINESS?
WAS THERE ANY CHANCE THAT SADAT COULD AGREE TO THIS? THE
SECOND POINT HE WANTED TO RAISE WAS THE QUESTION WHETHER
THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF ISRAEL CONCLUDING A SEPARATE PEACE AGREE-
MENT WITH EGYPT, ASSUMING ALL THE BILATERAL ISSUES WERE
RESOLVED IF SADAT SAYS NO TO THIS PROPOSITION, THEN
EVERYONE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT
SECRET

SECRET

WERE POSSIBLE FOR SADAT TO PROCEED IN THIS MANNER, THEN
HE WAS SURE ISRAEL AND EGYPT COULD FIND A WAY TO SOLVE
ALL THE INTERVENING PROBLEMS.

10. WITHOUT GIVIN ME A CHANCE TO RESPOND TO THESE
REMARKS WHICH HAD BEEN FRAMED IN TERMS OF QUESTIONS, BEGIN
SAID HE HAD TWO REMARKS TO MAKE. BECAUSE OF
THE IMPACT OF NOMENCLATURE, HE WOULD LIKE TO GET
AWAY FROM THE PHRASE "SEPARATE PEACE." IF HE RECALLED
CORRECTLY, IN 1949, WHEN THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS
WERE BEING NEGOTIATED, THE ARAB PARTIES SIGNED SEQUENTIALLY
AND WITH QUITE A BIT OF TIME SEPARATING THESE AGREE-
MENTS. YADIN CONFIRMED THIS FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE,
SAYING THAT EGYPT HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO SIGN, THEN JORDAN AND
LEBANON, AND FINALLY SYRIA. EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE FIRST

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED. BEGIN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS
AN IMPORTANT AND RELEVANT PRECEDENT. THESE WERE
SERIOUS AGREEMENTS, WITH MUCH OF THE UNDERTAKINGS IN THEM
THAT WOULD EVENTUALLY BE IN PEACE TREATIES. SYRIA, HE RECALLED,
HAD BEEN VERY ANGRY AT EGYPT FOR PROCEEDING ON ITS OWN.
BUT ULTIMATELY SYRIA ALSO SIGNED THE SAME AGREEMENT.
BEGIN SAID HE THOUGHT THIS PRECEDENT SHOULD BE KEPT IN
MIND IN RELATION TO PRESENT PROCEEDINGS. LET'S TALK
ABOUT A "FIRST PEACE TREATY" INSTEAD OF "SEPARATE PEACE."

NOTE BY OC/T: NODIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. SUMMERS, S/S-O.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00692 03 OF 05 081151Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
----------015709 081333Z /41
O R 080902Z MAR 78
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0476
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 JERUSALEM 0692
NODIS
FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 76

12. THE SECOND REMARK THE PRIME MINISTER WANTED TO MAKE
WAS THAT PERHAPS THE TWO COMMITTEES COULD BE MERGED INTO
ONE. PERHAPS, USING AMERICAN PARLANCE, WE COULD CALL IT
A POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMITTEE. THEN IT COULD HOLD
ALTERNATE SESSIONS IN CAIRO AND JERUSALEM. WHEN IT WAS
JUDGED THAT THE SUBJECT TO BE TAKEN UP WAS PRIMARILY
MILITARY, THE DEFENSE MINISTERS COULD PRESIDE. WHEN THE
SUBJECT WAS POLITICAL, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD TAKE OVER.

13. WITH RESPECT TO THE LATTER POINT, I COMMENTED THAT IF
AND WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER DECIDED HE WISHED TO PUT THIS
FORWARD AS A FORMAL PROPOSAL, I WOULD BE HAPPY TO CONVEY

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

IT. BUT I THOUGHT THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD MAKE
SUCH A PROPOSAL PREMATURE.

14. YADIN SAID HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT THE ARGUMENT
THAT HAD OPENED UP ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF WITH-
DRAWAL IN RESOLUTION 242. HE WONDERED WHERE THIS ALL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00692 03 OF 05 081151Z

REALLY CAME FROM. IT SEEMED TO HIM TO BE A DIVERSTION FROM
THE REAL ISSUES. WASN'T IT GETTING INTO AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
THEORETICAL MATTERS? ISRAEL ENDORSED 242 AS A BASIS FOR
NEGOTIATIONS, BUT LIKE THE ARABS, IT HAD ITS OWN INTER-
PRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS IN THAT RESOLUTION.
BEGIN SAID HE FULLY AGREED WITH THESE REMARKS.

15. I SAID I WOULD TRY TO RECOLLECT AS WELL AS I COULD
HOW THIS MATTER HAD BECOME AN ISSUE. BEGIN AND YADIN
WOULD RECALL THAT WHEN SECRETARY VANCE WAS HERE IN AUGUST HE
PRESENTED HIS PROPOSAL OF FIVE PRINCIPLES. ONE OF THOSE
PARAGRAPHS INCLUDED THE PHRASE "WITHDRAWAL ON ALL
FRONTS," AND THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF HAD INDICATED
THIS PARAGRAPH COULD ONLY BE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL WITH
THE DELETION OF THAT PHRASE. THIS POSITION, OF COURSE, HAD MADE
THE ARABS ALL THE MORE DETERMINED TO KEEP IT IN. AT THE
TIME WE FELT INCLUSION OF THAT PHRASE WAS ENTIRELY CON-
SISTENT NOT ONLY WITH THE POSITION THAT WE HAD HELD OVER THE
YEARS, BUT ALSO WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT ISRAEL'S INTERPRETA-
TION HAD BEEN DURING THE SAME PERIOD. THIS WAS PUTTING A DIFFERENT
INTERPRETATION ON THIS PROVISION OF THE RESOLUTION. THE PROBLEM FADED
AWAY BECAUSE THE "FIVE PRINCIPLES" DIDN'T GO ANYWHERE AND
EVERYBODY TURNED TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE GENEVA
WORKING PAPER.

16. THE NEXT CONCERN WHEN THIS ISSUE AROSE, AS FAR AS I COULD
RECOLLECT, WAS WHEN SADAT CAME TO WASHINGTON
AND DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE
ABOUT ISRAEL'S SELF-RULE PLAN WITH
ITS PROVISION THAT ISRAEL WOULD PUT
ASIDE, BUT NOT RELINQUISH, ITS CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY IN THE WEST
BANK AND GAZA. THIS RAISED A QUESTIONMARK IN SADAT'S MIND
ABOUT A SOLUTION OF THE WEST BANK/GAZA PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JERUSA 00692 03 OF 05 081151Z

242, AND WE INCLUDED THE PHRASE "WITHDRAWAL ON ALL FRONTS" IN THE
UNITED STATES STATEMENT ON SADAT'S DEPARTURE TO MAKE OUR POSITION
CLEAR. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SUBSEQUENTLY TAKEN ISSUE WITH

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

THIS FORMULATION. LOOKING BACK ON IT, ONE COULD SAY THAT THE ISSUE
HAD REAMINED LATENT FOR
MANY MONTHS BUT HAD NOW BEEN BROUGHT TO THE SURFACE BECAUSE OF
ITS FUNDAMENTAL IMPORT IN THE BACKGROUND OF NEGOTATIONS ON THE
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND TO THE BEGINNING OF DISCUSSIONS
ON WEST BANK AND GAZA ARRANGEMENTS.

17. BEGIN SAID HE HAD ONLY ONE CORRECTION TO MAKE. THIS QUESTION
HAD ITS ORIGIN AS EARLY AS JULY OF LAST YEAR
WHEN HE HAD VISITED WASHINGTON AND HAD CONVERSATIONS WITH
BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY. AT THAT TIME, THE
SECRETARY OUTLINED FOR HIM THE FIVE POINTS AND
WHEN THE SECRETARY CAME TO THE PHRASE "WITHDRAWAL ON
ALL FRONTS," BEGIN HAD SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO TALK TO THE
PRESIDENT ABOUT THIS. HE IN FACT HAD THAT TALK THAT
EVENING, AT WHICH HE OUTLINED THE ISRAELI POSITION, AS
APPROVED BY THE CABINET, THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE
WILLING TO PLACE THESE TERRITORIES UNDER FOREIGN SOVEREIGNTY.
AT THIS POINT, BEGIN READ FROM HIS RECORD OF CONVERSATION
OF THAT MEETING. BEGIN SAID THE PRESIDENT NEITHER
ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED THIS POSITION BUT (HE BEGIN) I TOLD HIM THAT
THIS WAS THE POSITION ISRAEL HAD DECIDED TO TAKE. LATER
IN AUGUST, WHEN SECRETARY VANCE HAD COME TO ISRAEL, HE
HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT THE U.S. COULD TAKE THE
POSITION THAT SC 242 WITHDRAWAL APPLIED TO ALL FRONTS
BUT THAT THIS WAS NOT ISRAEL'S POSITION.

18. BEGIN SAID THAT SECRETARY VANCE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
IT IS NOT CLEAR WHO HAS SOVEREIGNTY IN THE WEST BANK
AND GAZA. IF IT IS NOT CLEAR, SAID BEGIN, ANYBODY COULD
MAKE HIS CLAIM. BEGIN SAID THAT DURING HIS FORTHCOMING
VISIT TO WASHINGTON, HE WAS GOING TO TRY TO RENEW THE
SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL'S POSITION, WHICH ISRAEL ONCE HAD, BUT WHICH
SECRET

SECRET

NOW SEEMED TO HAVE GONE INTO ABEYANCE EVER SINCE
SADAT'S VISIT. BACK IN DECEMBER, EVERYBODY IN WASHINGTON
-- THE PRESIDENT, SENATORS, AND OTHERS IN WASHINGTON --
HAD GIVEN THEIR SUPPORT TO ISRAEL'S PEACE PROPOSALS.

19. BEGIN SAID HE NOW HAD AN IMPORTANT POINT TO CONVEY.
WE WOULD RECALL THAT AS ORIGINALLY DISCUSSED THE BEGIN PLAN
INCLUDED THE PROVISION THAT AFTER FIVE YEARS THE PROVISIONS
OF THE PLAN "MAY BE REVIEWED." SECRETARY VANCE HAD SUGGESTED
THAT THE WORD "MAY"" BE REPLACED WITH THE WORD "WILL." THE
CABINET HAD AUTHORIZED THIS CHANGE. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS
VERY IMPORTANT. UNDER THE SELF-RULE PLAN, THERE WOULD BE A
LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AND WITH THIS CHANGE, THE ELECTED
PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIES WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DEMAND
THAT ANYTHING AND EVERYTHING IN THE PLAN BE CHANGED AT THE END

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

OF FIVE YEARS.

NOTE BY OC/T: NODIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. SUMMERS, S/S-O.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00692 04 OF 05 081225Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
----------016139 081339Z /41
O R 080902Z MAR 78
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0477
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 JERUSALEM 0692
NODIS
FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 76

20. BEGIN REPEATED THAT THERE WERE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF 242. THE ARAB'S INTERPRETATION WAS THAT THIS MEANT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. THE U.S. NEVER AGREED TO THIS INTERPRETATION, BUT IT NEVER INSISTED THAT THE ARABS GIVE IT UP. BEGIN SAID NOBODY IN ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. THE ALIGNMENT GOVERNMENT DID NOT ACCEPT IT ANY MORE THAN HE DID. HE SAID ISRAEL ACCEPTS 242 AND WOULD STICK TO THAT POSITION. BUT ISRAEL HAD A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION AND ISRAEL BELIEVED IT WAS ENTITLED TO THAT INTERPRETATION. ISRAEL, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD NEVER ACCEPTED THE INTERPRETATION THAT 242 MEANT ONLY MINOR MODIFICATIONS IN THE 1967 BORDERS. BEGIN SAID I WOULD RECALL THAT HE HAD ASKED THE PRESIDENT NOT TO USE THIS PHRASE BECAUSE ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT IT. WHEN THE ALIGNMENT WAS IN POWER, IT MAINTAINED AN INTERPRETATION THAT WOULD HAVE PARTITIONED THE WEST BANK IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LEAVE

SECRET

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

ISRAELI FORCES PERMANENTLY ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER.
THIS DOESN'T HAPPEN TO BE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S
PLAN. BEGIN THEN READ AN EXTENSIVE PASSAGE FROM THE
RECORD OF HIS DECEMBER CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT
TO SHOW THAT HE HAD SPELLED OUT THE DIFFERENCE IN ISRAEL'S
APPROACH ON THE QUESTION OF
WITHDRAWAL ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS
OPPOSED TO OTHER FRONTS.

21. I SAID I WISHED TO MAKE ONE PRINCIPAL COMMENT TO
ALL OF THIS. FROM THE MOMENT OF ITS BIRTH THERE HAD
BEEN AN ARGUMENT ABOUT WHETHER THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION
OF 242 MEANT THAT WITHDRAWAL HAD TO BE TO THE 1967 LINES
OR NOT. WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TIME AND AGAIN THAT
WE NEVER ACCEPTED THE ARAB INTERPRETATION; THAT IS
WOULD REQUIRE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1967 LINES. BUT DURING
THE DECADE AFTER THE PASSING OF RESOLUTION 242 THERE
WAS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF
WITHDRAWAL APPLIED TO ALL
FRONTS. THE RECORD SHOWED CLEARLY -- AND WE HAD GONE OVER
THIS IN SOME DETAIL WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE OTHER
DAY -- THAT NOT ONLY THE U.S., BUT THE FORMER GOVERNMENT
OF ISRAEL BELIEVED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION APPLIED
TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS WELL AS OTHER FRONTS.

22. YADIN SAID IT SEEMED TO HIM THERE WAS SOMETHING
UNFAIR ABOOUT THE PRESENT U.S. POSITION. WOULDN'T
IT BE MORE EQUITABLE AND APPROPRIATE FOR THE U.S. TO MAKE THE
POINT, AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS ASSERTING THAT WITHDRAWAL
HAD TO APPLY TO ALL FRONTS, THAT IT ALSO DID NOT BELIEVE
THIS MEANT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL? "WHY ADMONISH JUST ONE
SIDE?" YADIN SAID IF THE ARABS WERE EVER TO AGREE THAT
WITHDRAWAL MIGHT NOT HAVE TO BE TOTAL, THEN ISRAEL IN TURN

WOULD BE PREPARED TO INDICATE THAT ITS INTERPRETATION THAT IT
DID NOT HAVE TO APPLY TO ALL FRONTS WOULD BE OPEN TO
NEGOTIATION.

23. YADIN SAID HE THOUGHT THE FACT THAT WE ARE CONCEN-
TRATING ON THIS QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL WAS
DETRIMENTAL TO THE WHOLE PEACE PROCESS. IF THE POINT
WAS TO GET INTO AN ARGUMENT ABOUT THE THEORETICAL HISTORY
OF RESOLUTION 242, WHAT ARE WE ALL DOING TALKING ABOUT
PARAGRAPH THREE AND FOUR IN THE DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES? THOSE PARAGRAPHS (DEALING WITH THE PALESTINIAN/WEST

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

BANK/GAZA ISSUESCLEARLY GO WAY BEYOND WHAT 242 HAS TO SAY.
SO OBVIOUSLY, WE WERE TALKING ABOUT A NEW
FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. WHY THEN GET BOGGED DOWN
WITH A DEBATE ABOUT "ORIGINAL SINS?" THIS COULD ONLY BE
A DISTRACTION FROM WHAT PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED.
BEGIN NODDED APPROVINGLY AT THE END OF YADIN'S COMMENTS
AND SAID NO ONE CAN DEMAND FROM ISRAELI THAT IT ACCEPT
WITHDRAWAL ON ALL THREE FRONTS. IT WAS NOT MENTIONED
IN RESOLUTION 242. IT WAS NOT MENTIONED IN ANY OF THE
DEBATES THAT TOOK PLACE ABOUT 242.

NOTE BY OC/T: NODIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. SUMMERS, S/S-O.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00692 05 OF 05 081234Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
----------016318 081343Z /41
O R 080902Z MAR 78
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0478
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 JERUSALEM 0692
NODIS
FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 76

24. AMBASSADOR LEWIS ASKED BEGIN WHETHER IT WASN'T TRUE
THAT WHEN HE LEFT THE GOVERNMENT IN 1970, HIS ACTION HAD BEEN
CAUSED BY HIS CONVICTION THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT AT THE
TIME HAD ACCEPTED THE APPLICATION OF 242 TO JUDEA AND SAMARIA?
BEGIN SAID THE FACT OF THE MATTER WAS THAT FOR THREE YEARS
ISRAEL DIDN'T ACCEPT RESOLUTION 242. THEN, IN AUGUST
1970, ISRAEL HAD MADE A STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE
GOVERNMENT WHICH ACCEPTED IT. LEWIS SAID,
BUT IF YOU ACCEPTED THAT INTERPRETATION THEN, WHY WAS
IT DIFFERENT NOW? THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IT HAD
ALWAYS BEEN HIS INTERPRETATION THAT WITHDRAWAL

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

SHOULD NOT APPLY TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. HE HAD LEFT
THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THE LABOR
PARTY'S INTERPRETATION OF 242. I ASKED
WHETHER BEGIN WAS NOT IN EFFECT ACKNODLEDGING THAT THE
PRESENT ISRAEL GOVERNMENT INTEREPRETATION DIFFERED FROM
THAT OF ITS PREDECESSORS? BEGIN SAID YES, HE SUPPOSED SO.

SECRET

SECRET

25. DAYAN SAID THAT BOTH AT THAT TIME AND NOW THE ISSUE
DEPENDED NOT ON LEGAL INTERPRETATION BUT RATHER POLITICAL
INTENTIONS. THE QUESTION TO ASK WAS: WHAT WERE THE ISRAELI
CABINET'S PLANS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN THOSE DAYS,
AND WHAT WAS IT NOW? IN THOSE DAYS, IT WAS THE ALLON
PLAN. DAYAN ASKED, WOULD THE U.S. HAVE ACCEPTED THE
ALLON PLAN AS HAVING BEEN COMPATIBLE WITH RESOLUTION
242. HE DOUBTED IT VERY MUCH. NOW THE
BEGIN GOVERNMENT HAD A DIFFERENT PLAN FOR THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA. IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH RESOLUTION
242 IN ISRAEL'S OPINION PROVIDED IT WOULD BE BASED ON
AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES WHICH WAS THE MAIN FEATURE
OF RESOLUTION 242. IN DAYAN'S VIEW, THE BEGIN PLAN WAS
WHAT PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES CALLED FOR -- IT WAS "GETTING
BACK TO REALITY."

26. THE MEETING ENDED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ONCE
AGAIN THANKING ME FOR MY EFFORTS AND SAYING THAT HE
THOUGHT THE MISSION HAD INDEED SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE.

27. COMMENT: EXTENDED AND ORCHESTRATED ISRAELI
PRESENTATION AT THIS FINAL MEETING ON THE RESOLUTION 242
WITHDRAWAL QUESTION CONTAINED SUGGESTION OF TWO POSSIBLE
ISRAELI LINES WE MAY HEAR MORE OF: (A) THAT
USG, NOT ISRAEL, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING AN ISSUE
OF THIS; AND (B) IF USG PERSISTS IN INSISTING ISRAEL
AGREE THAT PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL APPLIES TO THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA, ISRAEL MAY INSIST ON DROPPING
PALESTINIAN LANGUAGE FROM DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND LIMTIING IT ONLY TO POINTS CONTAINED IN
RESOLUTION 242.
NEWLIN

SECRET

SECRET

NOTE BY OC/T: NODIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O.

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

SECRET

NNN

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRIME MINISTER, PALESTINIANS, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, WEST BANK, MEETING REPORTS, NEGOTIATIONS, PEACE PLANS, SELFDETERMINATION, MILITARY OCCUPIED ARE AS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978JERUSA00692
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: FROM ATHERTON
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P850056-2661, N780003-0334
Format: TEL
From: JERUSALEM
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780394/aaaadbhu.tel
Line Count: 601
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 6bcc97cb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3407308
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN MARCH 7
TAGS: PGOV, PBOR, XF, US, IS, EG, (BEGIN, MENACHEM), (ATHERTON, ALFRED L JR)
To: STATE SS MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/6bcc97cb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014